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In the days when Appeasement was in full flower, from
the 15 September 1938 Munich Conference to the 15 March,1939
occupation of Prague, the governments of both Great Britain
and France invited Reichsgruppe Industrie, the "peak organization" for business in national socialist Germany, to join
their national industry associations in the formation of
cartels to divide global markets, international consortia to
undertake turnkey projects in the colonies, and joint·ventures
to reconstruct the economy of fascist Spain.

The businessmen

of the Reich w:ere, then, called upon to "save the peace" by
joining with their Anglo-French colleagues in exploiting the
rest of the world for their mutual benefit. 1
The idea, while futile, was no mere will o' the wisp.
It was rather an effort to elaborate on a theme whose importance is still largely unrecognized, namely the development to
replace discredited laissez-faire of a new cormnon outlook
among the businessmen of Western Europe.

It can be subsumed

under the heading "industrial self-:-government."
was its place of origin.

The Reich

By the late 1920s the important

pranches of German industry were organized into cartels and
trade associations.

Under the aegis of such bodies, whose

functions were in fact often interchangeable, markets could
be allocated, prices maintained, patents exchanged, l•ration-:alizat±on" plans formulated and put into practice,. labor
disciplined, and g.overnments influenced.

Advocates extolled

"industrial self:e-government '' as a solution to the problems

2

of industry, national economic policy,- and even international
diplomacy. 2
In the Western Europe of the Depression years, "industrial
self-government" became the dominant big business philosophy.
In Britain, its main proponents were initially to be found
within the ministries---Board of Trade, Foreign Office, Treasury, The Bank of England, etc.

After 1931, and sometimes in

the teeth of strong opposition; the National Government vigorously promoted the formation of· industry associations and
cartels with a view to the somewhat contrary purposes of both
protection and modernization.

In France, laissez~faire had

been discredited in fact if not in theory by 1929; agreements
in restraint of .trade existed in every branch of the French
economy.

There the new outlook develope'd first from within

the technocracy' and big business.

Prominent figures from

these circles exercised pressure on the government throughout
i

the 1930s to make use of industry associations for the formation and implementation of national economic policy.

In

Belgium, the advocates came from within the management of the
holding companies which dominated the nation's economy.

They

imposed German organizational methods within industry, while
at the same time effectively making national economic policy
from behind the scenes.

·3

In the Reich itself, finally,

"industrial self-government" becaine the official economic
doctrine of national socialism.

Exi~ting industry associa-

tions were strengthened, new ones formed, and the whole

3

edifice of organized business re-named Reichsgruppe Industrie.
Its branch-industry components, the Wirtschaftsgruppen, took
over the responsibility of managing the conversion to the
rearmament economy.

4

By the time of Munich, in other words,

cartels and producer associations existed for every branch
of industry in each of the industrial nations of Western
Europe, and those who viewed them as instruments of a new
.

approach to doing business were well-positioned in their
respective economies.
The Anglo-French idea that this common outlook could
provide the basis of a general diplomatic settlement-with,the
Reich was based above all on the good relations existing between the heavy industry of their nations and that of the
dominant producer area in Western Europe, the Ruhr.

The

·most important monument to them was the "second" International
Steel Cartel formed in February 1933 by the producers of the
Reich, France, Belgium,'and Luxembourg.
April 1935.

Britain joined {tin

The entente not only dealt satisfactorily with

the main export problems facing the industry but also those
resulting from llpolitics"---shifts in borders, changes in
tariff structures, competitive devaluations, and the imposition
of import and export quotas.

The alliance in steel generated

complementary arrangements in coal.

The Reich formed ententes

in both coke and coal with its main competitor, Great Britain,
to which the other European exporters eventually subscribed.
It also enjoyed a privileged relationship as supplier to both

4
;:

i

France and the Bel-Lux union.

These ties held implications

for the long-run development of the national industries involved
which, in some respects, outweigh their immediate importance in
. the diplomacy of the post-Munich period.

Behind the Anglo-

French "economic appeasement" initiative was, at any rate, the
hope that the "community of i~terest" in Western European heavy
industry could be worked into a broader settlement for industry
as a whole.
The Internationale Rohstahlgemeinschaft (IRG) was formed
25 February 1933 by representatives from the national steel
producer associations of Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxemburg and grew in size and strength until the suspension of its
~perations on 1 September 1939.

On 30 April 1935 the British

Federation of Steel Industries became ~ssociated with it,
thereafter forming with the original signatories ("the Continental Group") the larger entity known as the Eu:i;-opean Steel
Cartel.

The producers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland

entered the latter over the following year, comprising a
third, if minor faction, the "Central European Group."
Finally, in November 1937 the' four major American steel producers, represented by the Steel Export Association of the
United States, affiliated with the Europeans.

Among steel

exporters, only Japan and Sweden.remained formally outside
IRG.

By 1938., over 85 percent of world steel exports were

directly under its control.

Its delegates assembled about once

a month to settle problems arising from within the industry

5

and changes in the general business environment, discourage
competition from outside, and extend the reach of the cartel
itself.

5

The strength of the IRG was due first of all to the adoption by its signatories of German methods of "industrial selfgovernment."

When the original International Steel Cartel

was organized in 1926, analogues to the Stahlwerksverband did
not exist elsewhere.

One of the purposes behind the formation

of the IRG was in fact to cartelize domestic markets through
regulatfon of exports.

The 1926 agreement assigned each sig-

natory a global production quota.

The amounts which could

not be exported through existing "sectional" cartels for
specialized products were to be absorbed on the domestic
market.

Success was only partial.

The French revived the

Comptoir Siderurgique, which was effective.

The Belgian

industry, however, remained disorganized and the domestic
market was too small to absorb export surpluses.

Belgian

underselling in fact wrecked the original IRG in 1932.

Great

Britain, for its part, was committed to free trade and there£ ore was no t

' t. 6
a party to i

The operation of the 1933 agreement presupposed effective
cartelization of domestic markets.

On 31 May 1933 a coopera-

tive commercial company, "Cosibel"

(Comptoir- de Vente de la

Siderurgie Belge), was founded to operate as a selling agent
on the Belgian ~arket.

In the new agreement a clear distinc-

tion could then be made between domestic and foreign sales.

6

Crude steel export quotas, subdivided by product, were assigned
on a sliding scale which, as exports increased, favored producers with large domestic economies such as France and Germany
but, as they fell, favored the export-dependent industries of
Belgium and Luxemburg.*

A number of reorganized, and some new,

"sectional" cartels underpinned the structure of the IRG, those,
in particular, for semi-finished products, structural shapes, merchant bars, thick plates,.medium plates, wire rods,. hot
rolled bands and strips, cold rolled bands and strips, ·piled
sheets, black sheets, galvanized sheets, rails, wire, tubes,
and tin plates.

Wholesaling was by means of comptoirs, which

existed for each specialized manufacture.

There ..were three

kinds of dealers:

those belonging to·mernber-firms, compto'ir
7
agents, and "authorized" importers on exclusive contract.

* TOTAL

ANNUAL CRUDE STEEL VALUE

OF EXPORTED COMMODITIE·s

6.8 million
metric tons
or less

11.5 million
metric tons
or more
%

%

Germany-Saar
Belgium
France
Luxemburg

29.2
29.0
20.6
21.2
100

33.7
26.0
23.5
16.8
100

7

The IRG was held together both by the superior economic
perfonnance of the Eur.opean steel industry and the diplomatic
-skill of its members.

World steel production increased from

66.~3 long tons i~ 1933 to 133.28 long tons in 1938, an historic

high.

While the .export trade _never fully recovered, reaching
;,.

only80 percent of 1929by 1938, the four European foundermembers enjoyed a disproportionate gain in exports, which
increased from 3.5 million tons in 1933 to 7 .. 1 million in 1938,
·the gains being shared between them on the basis of the quota
agreements.

The IRG probably deserves credit for the improve-

ment in steel export prices which occurred during these years,
since considerable production capacity in both Belgium and
Luxemburg remained idle even during 19.38.

It is. also true that

by resorting to embargo and underselling, or threats of the
same, the IRG was often able to frustrate the plans of wouldbe competitors.

The IRG did not promote the kind of "ration-

alization" efforts which might have brought the European
_industry abreast of U.S. standards of competitiveness.

It

was at least partly responsible, however, for the restoration
of several continuous years of profitability to-British and
German· steel and at least intermittent ones to the industries
of France, Belgium, and Luxemburg. 8

More importantly, the

leaders of the cartel headed off a succession of political
crises.

In so doing, they forged the-bonds of a "community

of interest," which, in its essentials, has survived up to the
present.

8

There were three such alliances.

The first, most funda-

mental, closest, enduring, and significant of them was between
the steel producers of the Ruhr and Lorraine.

It developed from

the settlement of the problems arising as a result of the end
on 10 January 1925 of duty-free entry into the Reich of raw
materials and finished products.

Rather than face a tariff

war, the Ruhr ceded an import quota, the famous "contingent
lorrain-luxembourgeois," to producers now cut off from the pre1918 Reich customs area.

Thanks to this arrangement, which

was concluded 4 November 1926, the Lorrainers found markets
for their excess capacities of semi-finished steel.

The Ruhr,

for its part, averted the imposition of tariffs which might
have eliminated the French market for German-manufactured
goods and encouraged the growth of competition.

The conclu-

sion of a Franco-German trade treaty as well as the original
I

•

International Steel Cartel (which also included Belgium and
Luxemburg) ·followed in short order. 9
These arrangements created within France a powerful
interest group whose aim it was to promote economic and political cooperation.with the Reich.

Its fortress was the Comit~

des Forges, a body dominated by the Laurent and De Wendel
families of Lorraine.

It numbered a few prominent supporters

from within industry (such as Henri de Peyremhoff of the comite
de houillieres, Rene Duchemin of Ets. Kuhlmann), the technocracy
(Coutrot, Branger), and the world of opinion-making (such as
the publicist Wladimir d'Ormesson, the historian Lucien Romer,

9
;:.

and the sociologist Andre Siegfried).

It could count on favor-

able treatment from an influential section of the press.

Big

'

industrialists owned four Paris dailies outright, Le Temps,
,

I\

,

.

Le Journal des Debats, L'Information, and La Journee Industrielle.

They subsidized ten others.

1

°

From September 1931

to October 1938 the group was well-represented in Berlin,.
namely by the French Ambassador Andre Fran9ois-Poncet.

He

was a director of both the Comite des Forges and the foundry
Ets. Japy.

His first speech, a plea for Franco-German indus-

trial cooperation, would provide the leitmotiv of the tenureship of "Hitler's favorite ambassador. 1111

And he, 'along with

his colleagues in France, were determined to make it work even
in the face of political obstacles.
The second a1·1iance was between. the Franco-German bloc
✓

,

,

.,

and the two holding companies (the Societe Generale de Belgique
•·

and the Banque de Bruxelles) which together dominated the coal
and steel industries of Belgium.

It was forged as a result of

the crisis precipitated by the British decisions of September
1931 to devalue the Pound by 30 percent and of the following
February to impose a 33-1/3 percent ad valorem tariff on.steel
imports.

Belgium, traditionally a free-trader, had responded

to the onset of Depression by cutting steel export prices by
50 percent, a move which, while eliminating profitability,
made possible an increase in its share of wo'rld exports from
9.8 percent in 1929 to 11.5 percent in 1931.

It offered the

additional advantage of maintaining demand for high-cost

10

Belgian coking. coal.

The British shift to protection cut Bel-

gian steel off from the market which previously had absorbed
one-third of total exports, caused the financial collapse of a.
number of independent foundries, jeopardized the future of the
mines, resulted in massive coal and steel dumping on the French
and German markets, and left the holding companies little choice
but eventually to enter_negotiations with the Franco-German
12
bloc for a new inter~ational steel cartei.
The Belgians in
fact launched the initiatives which resulted in the formation
of the "second" International Steel Cartel in February 1933.
The decision to join the entente, it is clear in retrospect, transformed Belgium into an economic dependency of the
Reich.

The IRG agreement entailed a prospective decrease over

the long-run in steel exports., and the share of the country in
1938 world exports was in fact only 2.9 percent as opposed to
4.2 percent in 1930.
. l y. 13
ing

Demand for Belgian coal shrank accord-

The holding companies therefore counted increasingly

on support from the Reich to improve the admittedly difficult
Belgian situation.

Ruhr steel, always at their request,

administered frequent "brow-beatings" to recalcitrant independent foundries, threatening at times to undercut them in
specialized export markets and at others intervening in complicated quota disputes within "Cosibel. 1114

As for Belgian

coal, its survival came to depend on the ·restraint of competition from the Ruh,r, toleration by IRG of occasional "excessive" steel exports, and complicated arrangements linking the

12

sale of Ruhr bunker coal through Antwerp to transport in Belgian
15
bottoms.
These arrangements, then, tied Belgium inextricably
into the heavy industry "community of interest" in Western
Europe.
The third bond linked Great Britain to the "Continental
Group."

It grew out of a crisis deliberately provoked by a

March 1935 increase in the British steel tariff to 50 percent.
The immediate purpose. behind it was to force the producers of
Belgium, France and Germany---all major exporters to Britain
---to enter negotiations leading to British entry into the
international steel cartel.

Here the National Government was

pursuing its long-term strategy of-promoting "industrial selfgovernment" through international agreements. 16 Negotiations
· were in fact swiftly concluded.
export quota

The British demand for an ·

occasioned· little controversy.· More importantly,

the British ceded an annual import quota of 525,00-670,000 tons

to the Continent, the distribution of which, however, was
tied to the machinery of the newly-formed British Iron and
Steel Federations.

The tariff increase was then repealed. 17

The'achievements of the National Government's strategy,
though few, sufficed to sustain it.

The 1932 tariff which,

it was hoped, would provide a "breathing space" permitting the
steel industry to modernize, did encourage mergers.

Thanks

to interventions by the Bank of England,_ 60 percent of steel
production had been concentrated into vertical combines.

1934. production was· running at 1929 levels.

By

Costs ·and prices,

13

however, continued to iricrease. 18

Affiliation with IRG after

1935 did not significantly change this situation.

The British

nonetheless took the lead in the negotiations which led to U.S.
affiliation with the international steel cartel and initiated
the discussions which led to the wider agreements in coke and
·
. 19
coal.
And it was in Britain, of course, where Economic
Appeasement was first raised to the level of foreign policy.
The "community of interest" in the heavy industry of
Western Europe was, then, a fact of life after 1933.

The

.governments of the Reich, France, and Great Britain {not to
mention Belgium) could either ignore it at their own peril or
use it for their own purposes.
ride it.

They could not, however, over-

What was in fact the relationship between it arid the

foreign policies of the Great Powers?

The matter requires

much closer examination than it has yet received.

Historians

and public alike have accepted with near-unanimity the crude
judgment that the international heavy industry cartels provided

Hitler the means to exercise a sort of dictatorship over world
20
. While it is true that their existe~ce
steel production.
proved beneficial to the Reich, the relationship between them
and Hitler's foreign policy is indirect and due also to the
intermediation of France and Britain.
Hitler lacked any policy towards internati.onal ententes
other than one of expediency.
grudgingly tolerated.

They we.re less desired than

The Party was traditionally hostile to

cartels of any sort, which its spokesmen denounced in principle

14

as agencies of irresponsible capitalist power.

Initial threats

from the regime to abolish them diminished, however, as they
demonstrated their usefulness, first, as instruments of recoverery policy and then of rearmament.

In July 1933 the Reich pub-

lished a decree, applied to tobacco and cement in early 1934,
allowing compulsory cartelizatio'n where necessary to prevent
unemployment.

21

With the creation of Wirtschaftsgruppen as

official organs of "industrial self-government," cartelization
was extended to those branches of industry where it did not
already exist.

Cartels and. Wirtschaftsgrup2en together there-

after took on the role of policy-administration within the
armament economy, determining the distribution of raw material
and foreign exchange and, to an extent, coordinating production
as well.
The Reich's critical shortage of foreign exchange after
1933, which was aggravated by the decision to re-arm, left it
with no choice but to work through the fr~ework of agreements
anchored in the international steel cartei. 22

The Reich

enjoyed a trade and payments surplus in Western Europe thanks
largely to the annual export there of about 20 million tons
of coal.

Without it the Reich would have been deprived of

the raw materials required by the.rearmament effort.

To main-

tain this trade, the steel industries of Western Europe- had,
in a word, to be provided with adequate operating levels.

It

is apparently in part for this reason that the regime never
pressured the Ruhr to demand an increase in the German export
quota.

In any case, once the rearmament boom had begun, steel

15

and coal shortages were felt on the domestic economy, thus
reducing official pressure to export either commodity.
The leaders of Ruhr heavy industry, while never "disloyal" to the regime, cooperated on the .whole unenthusiastically.

The chief German representative to the IRG, Ernst

Poensgen, overcame the initial opposition of the majority of
the steel industry to joining the IRG with the argument that
the only alternative to membership was a high steel tariff
which would put the industry at the, mer.cy of the regime.

24

Conflict between the two parties later broke out, of course,
over the refusal of the industry to increase its consumption
of low-grade domestic ore---something that would have wrought
havoc with its cost structure---and was intensified by the
decision to construct Reichswerke Hermann GOring, a regimesubsidized enterprise which broke the Ruhr steel-producing
monopoly.

25

After the onset of full employment in· 1937,

repeated disagreements over delivery priorities perpetuated
the ill-feelings.

The Ruhr found itself often being,ordered

to step up domestic sales of steel and coal, as well as those
to politically-preferred foreign buyers such as Italy._ It
therefore had to sacrifice, forfeit, or hand over traditional
customers such as, for instance, ARBED of Luxemburg, the
.
.
1
.
1 26
b iggest
singe
foreign
pure h aser o f •co k'ing coa.

Within

the international cartels it made sense, then, for the Ruhr
to act as Honest Broker.

And so it did.

It accepted·a very

modest initial quota in the coal and coke conventions.

In

16

addition, it effectively dealt out portions of its IRG quota
with a view to increasing its capital of goodwill.

27

To those

privy to international business.negotiations, German behavior
thus presented itself in the guise of a paradox:

as the

aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign°policy increased, the Ruhr
became more conciliatory.
The National Government in Great Britain was, as BerndtJftrgen Wendt has demonstrated in expaustive detail, the main
progenitor of the attempt to build a diplomatic settlement
with the Reich on the structure of international cartel agreements.28

British affiliation with the IRG set a precedent:

it was .followed by the conclusion of the Anglo-Germ~n naval
agreement·of

18

June 1935.

Successful conclusion of the

negotiations in coal, it was hoped in the post-Munich days,
would lead to a still broader settlement in industry, and
even between the two nations as well.
The Anglo-German Trade and Payments Convention of 1
November 1934, which remained in effect until the outbreak
of war, provided the framework for settlement of coal export
issues.

It assigned the Reich, which considered it "the

best and most favorable of all clearing agreements," with a
trade surplus in the proportion of 100:55.

29

Here, then,

was powerful incentive for Germany to increase exports from
Great Britain.
to accept.

Coal was simply the most convenient product

In early 1932, the Reich imposed an import quota

of 100,000 tons per month on British coal to stave off the

17

flood of_the commodity through North Sea ports which otherwise
would have resulted from the Pound devaluation.

30

Once the

payments agreement had taken effect, however, the Reich exercised pressure on the Rheinischwestf~lj.scheskohnlensyndikat
not to compete in the Hamburg-Bremen market, and imports from
Britain were allowed to increase to 193,118 tons per month by
1937.

31

The share of the Reich in total British coal exports

increased from 6.4 percent to 8.0 percent in the same years.
The coal and coke negotiations, running intermittently
for over four years, faced an obstacle in the form of British

"

weakness which the Ruhr, however, overcame.thanks to judicious use of its increasing strength.

Britain first initiated

discussions for a general coal-coke convention in March 1935.
They continued for the duration of the year.

32

The Central

Council, set up by the Coal Mines Act of 1930, was, however,
.too divided to act on behalf of the entire British.industry.
The Ruhr therefore favored including the other main Continental
exporters (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland-) in any eventual agreement.

There was confusion, finally, as to whether

the convention should extent to coke as well as coal and
33
include maritime as well as continental markets.
An improvement in the Ruhr's situation paved the way to
the conclusion of the Anglo-German coke convention of July
1936.

The settlement rested in particular on the Ruhr provid-

ing Britain compensation in the hitherto competitive BalticScandinavian market for the 12 percent of its total exports

18

market in Italy lost as a result of-the "Ethiopian embargo."
The Anglo-Germans agreed that of total European coal exports
of 11.4 million tons the Reich should receive a quota of 5.6
million tons (48.4 percent) and Great Britain of 2.4 million
tons (20.88 percent).

The inclusion of the other three export-

ers was frustrated temporarily by chaotic conditions in Belgium,
which had experienced labor strife, prospective regulation at
the hands of a royal commission, and, finally, a short-lived
boom due to the .devaluation in

Marc~

1935 of the Belga and

labor problems at the French mines. On,11 June 1937, however,
they also entered the convention. 34 ·
On 7 November 1938 Sir Frederick Leith-<Ross

proposed to

a German trade mission returning from Dublin a resumption of
the coal talks, which had been proceeding in desultory fashion
through most of the year.

His has all the earmarks of-a well-

laid plan •. The Germans were 'presented with a detailed memorandum outlining ·a bargaining position.

Total British coal

sales, it was noted, had dropped by 20 percent since 1933 while
those of the Reich had increased by a third, thus shifting
Anglo-German export rations from 5:3 to 1:1 between that date
and 1937.

The memorandum holds a secret subsidy responsible

for the absolute and relative decreases in German coal prices
and proposes formation of a joint cartel as the only alternative to a "production tax on the use of coal."

The Germans

are also-reminded that they stand to benefit more from a 15-20
percent price increase to British levels than would be lost' by

19

reduced sales.

35

Thanks to the ·"restraining influence exer~

cised by the Board of Trade on the representatives of the
British, industry,_" negotiations proceeded past unusual disagreements concerning the comparability of statistics and basis
years for quotas; agreement was reached on 28 January 1939,
Great Britain receiving a quota of 46.27 percent, the Reich,
32.08 percent, and the rest left to be divided between the·
three secondary exporters. 36
To the "economic appeasers" at the Board of Trade and
Foreign Office, the chief value of the coal agxeement was as
a springboard to an interindustry pact between Britain and
the Reich.

"The coal trade talks," according to the President

of the Board.of Trade Oliver Stanley, "have been valuable precursors to the wider talks now to start.

From them we can

draw many lessons and much encouragement ..•

It might be·

possible to look back upon [their] conclusion as a turning
point, not only in the methods of Anglo-German' industrial
relations, but also in the history and hopes of the world. 1137
The famous IID-0.sseldorf Agr,eement" concluded between the
Federation of British Industry and Reichsgruppe Industrie on
16 March 1939 reflected these exalted ambitions.
public statement noted agreement on twelve points.
pedestrian:

A joint
Some·were

existing cooperative efforts should be built on,

exports should raise living standards and be profitable, and
destructive competition should be ended.

For the rest, the

agreement foresaw nothing less than the creation of a world

20

economic partnership of the two countries.

The National

Government•·s long-standing policy of encouraging domestic
cartelization along German lines was affirmed.

Both parties

concurred that, as with the coke and coal understandings, outsiders were to be invited to enter only after Anglo-German
agreement had been reached.

Individual branches of industry

were, moreover, directed to begin negotiations immediately
with a view to forming bilateral cartels.

Finally, the

industry associations of both nations promised to invoke the
powers of their respective governments, jointly if.necessary,
38
to coerce.into compliance the industries of third countries.
With this agreement, "economic appeasement" reached its highwater mark.

Once the Eublic had registered reaction to the

15 of March occupation of Prague it was no longer politic for

the government to speak openly about the desirability of reaching mutually profitable deals .of any kind with the Hitler
regime.
In France, public animosity towards Germany simply ruled
out .the.adoption of "economic appeasement" as national policy
until, that is, the diplomatic system created by the Versailles
treaty had visibly begun to collapse.

From 1933 to 1936,

Franco-German trade relations were allowed to <:!.eteriorate
alarmingly~

Change in economic policy towards Germany, when

it came in early 1937, was presented as mere "normalization"
when, in fact, behind it was the hope, cultivated by the
Comite des Forges, that mutual rearmament would bring

21

reciprocal benefits to both nations.

Under Foreign Minister

George Bonnet, finally, "economic appeasement" became official
French foreign policy.

For France it was even more of an

absurdity than for Britain.
"L'equilibre par le bas" was, according to Pierre MendesFrance, the operative principle in Franco-German economic relations after the collapse of the 1927 trade treaty in 1932. 39
German foreign exchange control, introduced that year, limited
the sale of French agricultural goods on German markets.

The

French "mathematical clause," which followed, restricted
German imports by product to fixed percentages of 1929.

The

28 July 1934 trade agreement brought a degree of order in the

relations between the two, but at a large cost to French
export interests.

It provided for a large German trade sur-

plus, 15.75 percent of which was to service the Dawes and
Young debt. 40 An unexpected increase in German purchases
soon threatened, however, to dry up the Reich's Franc balance
at the "Office franco-allemand des paiements commerciaux."
In August 1935 the French government restricted exports to the
Reich, first to 85 percent of 1935 and then further until
such a time as Germany had "worked up" its payments surplus.
By December 1936 the Franc balance had been restored, thanks

in large part to a reduction of French exports from 189
million RM in 1932 to 98 million RM in 1936.
.

.

set f or a new b eg1nn1ng.

41

The stage was
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Rearmament made it desirable for France, and arguably
necessary, to revive the pre-World War I Ruhr coke-Lorraine
ore traffic.

The Ruhr normally supplied four-fifths of the

coking coal requirements of the foundries of eastern France.
Alternative suppliers were uncompetitive in the area and could
\

only through strenuous exertions have met the anticipated
increase in demand.

The French, moreover, seem to have had

doubts about Britain's reliability, not least of all because
of her refusal to consult during the negotiations for the
coal and coke understandings with the Reich. 42
The relationship between Ruhr and Lorraine, on the other
hand, remained close.

The two. encountered little difficulty,

for instance, in resolving the complicated issues which
resulted from the return of the Saar to the. German customs
area on 12 Februa.ry 1935.

The Ruhr, first of all, agreed to

absorb the 450,000 tons of steel per year which the Saar nor-

'
mally sold
on the French market, and, in return,·received a
slight increase from the IRG in its export quota.

Thus the

French did not have to increase steel tariffs, an act which
would have had serious adverse consequences for the Laurent
rolling mills in Lorraine, ·which were normally supplied by
their foundries in Dillingen (Saar).

As for coal, agreement

was reached for German purchase of the French state-owned Saar
mines by means of payment in kind.· The transfers were handled
through the special nsicap" arrangement.

By 1936 coal, most

of it from the Saar, was in fact the only important German
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export commodity to France.

43

Negotiations for a new coke-ore agreement, conducted
privately between representatives of French and German heavy
industry, began in March 1937.

44

German industry in fact

stood to gain comparatively little from it.

The Ruhr had

little coal to sell and, in addition., was quite satisfied
with its supply relationship with Sweden which, it believed,
could be developed as required by ·rising demand.

Schacht,

however, seized on the initiative as opening a new source of
fo.reign exchange.
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The ore-coke agreement arrived at called,

first, for an increase in German iron-ore imports from the 1935
monthly average of 490,000 to 600,000, it being understood
that amounts could be raised once "labor difficulties" had
been solved.

More significantly, German coke deliveries to

France were to be immediately stepped up from a monthly rate
of 116,000 tons per month to 275,000 tons.

It was understood,

finally, that "The French have agreed to fill all of their
coke import requirements from Germany. 1146
The coke-ore agreement was the nucleus of the 10 July
1937 trade treaty signed with fanfare by ReichsbankprAsident
Schact and French Foreign MinisterDelbos at the Paris Exposition.

The French business press, indeed the public, received

it enthusiasticaliy.

47

The men most directly involved in the

negotiations heralded it as the .dawn of a new era in FrancoGerman relations.

The German embassy telegrammed Berlin that

"Handelsminister [Chapsal] hielt sehr beachtliche Tischrede.
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Nach Begrfissung der Ga.ste betonte er zungchst gros-se Bedeut~ng
Vertragswerks, die weit tlber solche gewOhnlichen Warenabkornmens
hinausgehe und als Ganges eine gltlckliche Liquidierung-zahlreicher anderer zwischen beiden ia.ridern offener Fragen mit sich
bringe.

Er selbst und franzOsische Regierung seien glftcklich

fiber das Erreichte, das geeignet sei, die Beziehungen zwischen
beiden La.ndern zu normalisieren und eine weitere Zusarnmenarbeit
im friediichen Einvernehmen zu gewghrleisten~ Abschluss Vertragswerks stellte somit in den Augen franzOsischer Regierung
gewissermassen einen feierlichen Augenbl1ck dar und sei
II

geeignet, eine neue Ara des Vertrauens und der Anna.herung in
den Beziehungen der beiden Nationem einzuleiten.

Er sei

sicher, dass diese Geffihl franzOsischer Regierung von sgmtlichen FranzOsen geteilt wftrden, die-in den Beziehungen zu
Deutschland nichts sehnlichster Wfinschten als eine 'atmosphere
plus calme, plus apaissee et amicale.'

Das Vertragswerk

stelle somit einen Ausgangspuhkt ~ar, bei dem man nicht Halt
machen dtlrfe ...-48 This was not the mere expression of pious
sentiments.

To insure the proper functioning of the coke-ore

exchange, the French Government-extended the work week at the
mines beyond forty hours, encouraged management to recruit
several thousand additional workers---foreigners if necessary,
and even directed French steel to provision itself to the maximum extent possible from the Ruhr mines.

In January 1938 it

specifically disallowed the placement of a large coke order
.
.
49
in
Belgium.·
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French post-Munich "economic appeasement'' reached the
same fantastic heights as in Britain.

Acting at the direction

of Foreign Minister Bonnet, Count de la Baurne (Head of the
Commercial Relations Section at the Quai d'Orsay) entered negotiations with a German trade delegation on 7 December 1938. 50
The most important of the many French proposals made over the
next three months fall under three headings.
first, a trade increase.

They involved,

In exchange for a German readiness

, to accept increased agricultural exports, France promised to
import 50 million Francs worth of synthetic nitrogen and to
provide German firms with public contracts (machine tools,
diverse machinery, scientific instruments, etc.) in the value
of 95 million Francs.

The proposals also involved the forma-

tion of joint ventures, particularly within the Empire~

De la

Baurne suggested "in a general way" harbor improvements in South
America, bridge and road building in t_he Balkans, and railway
construction in Africa.

A Franco-German consortium, it was

suggested, should be set up to handle repair and recovery work
in Franco Spain.
to the Empire:

A note of 11 March 1939 specifies with regard
the opening of the Conakry m:i,ne for mutual

exploitation, a joint paper manufacturing project, and the
expansion of the Moroccan manganese mines to meet rising Reich
demand.

Other collaborative efforts are to include the con-

clusion of a contract between Societe francaise
de Chatillon:.
Comrnentry and Vereinigte Stahlwerke to barter 10 million francs
of machine tools for the ore mine at Halouze (Orne) against
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delivery over a two-year period of one-half of planned production
of 300,000 tons per year.

The third set of proposals involved

the immediate "adaptation aux circonstances presentes des
ententes industrielles existantes et l'extension des ententes
·
11 es categories
'
•
·
•
n51
a d es nouve
de production.

Planning for dis-

cussions between the Confederation General·e du Patronat and
the Chambre de Commerce de· Paris on the one ha~d and Reichsgruppe
Industrie on the other were to·begin at once for the conclusion
of a general inter-industry pact.

11

Ces diverses propositions,"

let it be added, "ne constituent qu'une pre:tniere etape dans la
voie d'echanges plus actifs entre les deux pays.

Mais la

realisation de ce programme initial pourra servir d'exemple
·dans l'avenir pour la conclusion d'aff~ires nouvel.les.

Le

Gouvernement fran~ais espere que les negotiations que vent
s'ouvrir, tant e~tre les services officiels des deux pays
qu'entre les industriels, sous le controle gouvernementale,
permettront d'etablir des bases d'une vast col:laboration
favorable

a l'economie

des deux pays~ 1152

On 22 February 1939,

a "C~ntre Economique-Franco Allemand" was founded.

It had

" .•• zur Aufgabe, die deutsch-franz5sischeri Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit allen Mitteln praktisch zu f5rdern, zu zentralisieren
und auszuweiten •••

Das 'Centre' wird gegrftndet van namhaften

ParJ.ementariern und den Pr!sident der grBssten frariz5sischen
Handelskammern. 1153
These ambitions must be seen against the dismal failure
in the recovery of Franco-German trade.

The industrialists of
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France and Germany were, in effect, being .asked to "divide the
world" at a time when French exports to the Reich had fallen to
one-quarter of 1929 levels (64L99 million RM to 155.68 million
RM), -and Gennan exports to France to one-third (934. 54 million
to 313.43 million RM).

Total French exports·to the Reich,

which rose to 155 million RM in 1937, actually fell to 141
million RM the following year, below the previous low of 281
million RM in 1934.

54

The results of the coke-ore exchange

were most disappointing of all.

German deliveries of coke,

targeted at 275,000 tons per month, fell to 113,000 tons per
month in the first third of 1938 and even further, to 90,000
tons per month, in the same period a year later.

French ore

deliveries to the Reich fell to a rate of 416,000 tons per
month in 1938.
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These results provided little basis indeed upon which
to build an economic partnership with the Reich.

The French

initiatives were in fact notably less successf'l~l than the
British.

Surveys of ReichsgrupE_e Industrie revealed, if any-

thing, a general disinclination to forming industrial ententes
with partners_ in France.

One file note divided German indus-

try policy towards the matter into three categories.

Ententes,

it specified, existed already in steel (including ·the products
covered by the "sectional" subsidiaries of IRG), safety pins,
and enameled cast iron, in the electrical industry, and in
buttons.

Other industries, secondly, sought closer agreement

with French partners..

The refiners of non-ferrous metals

28

wanted to include the French in existing conventions with the
Belgians and Dutch.

The electrical industry wanted more speci-

fic agreements with regard to third country markets; the
machine industry, participation in turnkey projects, specifically in the colonies; the railroad car industry, the right
to sel.l to the SNCF.

The manufacturers of wood~working

power tools sought to break the Paris monopoly of French competitors; the fur industry, to gain more finishing operations
from French tanners; the ceramic industry, to reach agreement
regarding third country markets.

The hand tool industry hoped

to reach price agreements with the "Syndicat National des
fabricants d'outils de Metier," as did the tin-box packing
industry, and the founders of cast fittings.

A third group

of producers expressed "virtually no interest" or none whatsoever in the formation of ententes.

It included the textile

industry, the garment industry, the iron war group, the steel
and plate war group, paper manufacturers, and the metal wares
group. 56 Koppen, the Reichsgruppe official in charge of negotiating with the French, therefore concl.uded in a letter of
2 March 1939 that "trotz Befragung der gesamten industriellen
Organisation keine ·nennenswerte

WOnsche fttr Verhandlungen

mit der franzOsische Industrie zugegangen sind.

Wo deutscher-

seits ein Bedttrfniss fttr Marktabreden bestand, sind diese
bereits getroffen worden und haben sich im·allgemeinen gut
bewahrt.

Allzuviel Material werden wir also filr deutsch.

franzOsische Industriebesprechungen kaum besteuern k~nnen.

11

57
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He therefore handled the matter in dilatory fashion until the
possibility of a second "Dfl.sseldorf Agreement" died of its own
inanition.
· The success of the Anglo-French efforts to broaden the
"communities of interest" between their national industries
and that of the Reich required a much more radical initiative
than any apparently contemplated by either government, i~volving namely the revision of the bilateral trade agreements in
effect with the Reich.

They had been set up with a view pri-

marily to protecting the interests of the Reich's c.reditors.
Frank Tiark of the City.branch of the Schroeder bank, who
served as head of the "Short-term Creditor Committee,_" deserves primary credit as architect of the trade.imbalance
provisions built into the 1 November 1934 Anglo-German trade
agreement.

The French, for their part, were extremely reluc-

tant either to allow the Reich to earn more francs than necessary· to service their debt-holders or to maintain large
Reichsmark balances of their own.

Thus the Vertragslosenzustand

of 1935-1936 in which the government of France restrained its
exporters in order to permit the re-accumulation of a German
F-ranc surplus.

The July 1937 agreement "mortgaged" 700.-800

million Francs of a targeted German trade surplus of 1500
million Francs for service of the Dawes and Young debt.

An

increase in the balance wouldr in other word~, put additional
foreign exchange in German hands, a decrease, threaten. the
interests of French creditors.
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The paraiyzing effects of th.ese agreements on trade were
recognized in a general way.

Lip service was paid, for instance,

to the "Van Zeeland Plan," a vague set of prescriptions for
harmonizing the trade practices of ·"totalitarian" economies
with the supposedly "free" ones of the democracies.

French

and British trade negotiators did almost nothing, however, to
remedy the specific deficiencies of the agreements in effect
with the Reich, even as their ministries were seeking to create
inter-industry pacts.

British trade officials, first of all,

gave no satisfaction to the large section of the manufacturing
•

industry which voiced the complaint that because of the trade,
imbalance provisions (and the preferred position of coal)
they faced increased competition on the domestic market from
the Reich while, at the same time, being forbidden to export
there.

Demands from British manufacturers that the "Dilsseldorf

Agreement" be predicated on German re-consideration of import
quotas fell on deaf ears.

Their eventual loyalty to it must

.
there f ore b e put into
ques t'ion. 58

French officials, at the same time, stood by with apparent
helplessness as the rigidities built into the July 1937 agreement brought on a near-collapse in commercial relations with
the Reich.

The reaction is puzzling, to say the least.

The

fall in Franco-German trade cannot be attributed simply to the
declining French production index because, in 1937-1938,
..
d • 59
.
overal 1 French foreign
tra d e increase

Nor can it be

argued that it was due to patriotic considerations, inasmuch
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as the maintenance of the ore-coke trade was of considerably
greater strategic value to France than the Reich.

Nor did

Germany refuse to export coke which, though in short supply,
became an actual bottleneck to trade only in Spring 1939. 60
As it was, a fall in French steel production and ore output
occurred in Fall 1937, allegedly as a result of labor difficulties.

It resulted in an immediate decline in the French

demand for coke, a reduction in German exports of the product,
to France, and a threat to the German Franc balance.

Once

again, the French government found itself in the position of

.

restraining exports, even in the face of opposition from both
the management and employees of the ore mines. 61

Until June

1939 it gave scant consideration to available measure's to
stimulate a trade increase:

lowering the interest rates paid

on Dawes and Young coupons or underwriting a portion of the
.debt (thus reducing the need for a German trade surplus) ;
stockpiling coke and coal for its own account in the interests
of rearmament; or simply subsidizing ore exports by accepting
paym~nt in overvalued Reichsmarks.

By then, however, trade

had decreased to such an extent as to threaten

unhinging for

the first time since 1926 the close relations between Lorraine
and Ruhr.

The July 1939 negotiations for a renewal of the

bila·teral trade treaty simply fell apart.

And the French dele-

gate, de Menzie, departed to the U.S. on a mission to purchase
the amounts of.coal which the Reich, by abrogating an.agreement which permitted the De Wendel Ruhr mines to supply to its

I

I

I
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French foundries outside the framework of the bilateral trade
treaty, had refused to deliver. 62
"Economic appeasement" is, to say the very least, difficult to defend as a policy.

It rested on a rnisund~rstanding of

the relationship between German industry and Hitler's foreign
policy, lacked public support, involved conflict with existing
diplomatic commitments, was lamed by internal contradictions and
pursued too late---then only halfheartedly.

It could only have

reinforced Hitler's belief- in the spinelessness of the AngloFrench leadership.
The ideas underlying it nonetheless lived on.
"

Sir Samuel

Beale, Chairman of the Board at Guest, Keen, ahd Nettlefolds,
Ltd., .and chief business representative to the Board of Trade's
Export Council, continued throughout the war to defend the
"Dttsseldorf Agreement," arguing that "in the present state of
the world's technical and political development, international
competition on the

old basis is uneconomic."

He felt that

" ... [American] social and political evolution is perhaps
twenty or thirty years behind that of Great Britain."

"A

greater degree of economic centralism will," he added,
"gradually develop in the U.S. sooner or later, [which] is
inevitable and healthy ..• and will, let it be hoped, be rapid
enough in the sphere of foreign trade to permit the organization of post war international commerce in industrial goods
[into cartels]. 1163

In Benelux, but above all in France, defeat

appeared as a blessing in disguise to technocratic visionaries
such as Bichelonne, Pucheu, Lehideux, and the men associated
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. h t h e Banque Worms. 64
wit

·They• welcomed t:he opportunity to

Germanize the structures of the French economy, expand the
apparatus of "industrial self-government" to include responsibility for raw materials allocation, "rationalization" and
long-term planning, and to enlist the Reich in setting up
European multinational enterprises in the fields· of chemicals,
automobile manufacture, and steel production.

Responsibility

for the conduct of relations with the industry of occupied
Western Europe rested by and large with German industry, and
was successful to the extent that strong ,pre-war cartel ties
existed and, less often, where new ones could be developed. 65
It is true that the war might have lasted longer had the Reich
taken better advantage of the offers for cooperation made by
the business and civil service leaders in France, Belgium,
and the Netherlands.

Of perhaps still greater interest, how-

ever, is the fact that in occupied Europe continuity of business tradition was preserved. - The pre-war cartels in Western
European heavy industry survived even the aftermath of German
defeat.

They emerged from it re-baptised as the European
.
66
The formation of the Common
Coa 1 and Stee 1 Community.
Market, then, can be regarded as a distant echo _of the hopes
expressed by the "economic appeasers" of the post-Munich
period:

that the "community of interest" in West European

coal and steel could be broadened to include industry as a
whole.
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